This article presents evidence of the scale, relative intensity, and social determinants of immigrants' transnational political engagement. It demonstrates that a stable and significant transnational field of political action connecting immigrants with their polities of origin does indeed exist. The results help temper celebratory images of the extent and effects of transnational engagement provided by some scholars. The article shows that migrants' habitual transnational political engagement is far from being as extensive, socially unbounded, "deterritorialized," and liberatory as previously argued. Transnational political action, then, is regularly undertaken by a small minority, is socially bounded across national borders, occurs in quite specific territorial jurisdictions, and appears to reproduce preexisting power asymmetries. The potential of transnationalism for transforming such asymmetries within and across countries has yet to be determined.
than one nation-state and are often generated from below by human migration (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Blanc 1992; Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994; Portes 1996; Smith and Guarnizo 1998) , social movements (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997; Tarrow 1998) , and nongovernmental organizations (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999) . The proliferation of grassroots transnational ties worldwide is a phenomenon of great significance but one that, so far, has received little attention in the sociological literature. Our goal in this article is to investigate one particular form of transnational engagement, namely the political activities conducted by contemporary immigrants across national borders, affecting communities, parties, and official institutions in the sending nations. From this analysis, we hope to draw general lessons modifying conventional expectations of what an immigrant is and what the process of adaptation to the host society is about.
Our main concern is to probe the extent, implications, and social determinants of cross-border political relationships initiated and maintained by contemporary migrants to the United States. Our analysis focuses specifically on the transnational political activities of three major Latin American immigrant groups residing in four major U.S. metropolitan areas. We seek to establish what types, scale, and intensity of political engagement prevail among these immigrants and to determine the individual and social factors that shape such participation.
In the past few years, the term "transnational" has become commonly and conspicuously displayed in the titles of conferences and discussion panels at scholarly meetings in the United States and Europe. This surge in interest has been accompanied, however, by mounting theoretical ambiguity and analytical confusion in the use of the term. Thus, while some scholars have started to embrace and deploy the concept in their work, others have responded with intense skepticism. Seeking to clarify the meaning of the term, several scholars have provided explicit definitions of "transnational migration" and "transnational fields." For Glick Schiller and Fouron (1999, p. 344) , for example, "transnational migration is a pattern of migration in which persons, although they move across international borders, settle, and establish relations in a new state, maintain ongoing social connections with the polity from which they originated. In transnational migration people literally live their lives across international borders. Such persons are best identified as 'transmigrants.'"
The problem with this definition is that it does not establish explicit criteria for differentiating those who participate in these activities from those who do not. If the simple act of sending remittances to families or traveling home occasionally qualifies a person as a "transmigrant," the entire field is subject to the charge of banality since it is well known that international migrants have always engaged in these activities (Foner 1997) .
The main difficulty with the field of transnationalism, as developed so far, is that its empirical base relies almost exclusively on case studies. 2 While useful, these studies invariably sample on the dependent variables, focusing on those who take part in the activities of interest, to the exclusion of those who do not participate. The unintended result is to exaggerate the scope of the phenomenon by giving the impression that everyone in the studied communities is involved. While the occasional trip home or a sporadic financial contribution to a home country political party certainly helps to strengthen the transnational field, these intermittent activities do not justify by themselves the coining of a new term. It is the rise of a new class of immigrants, economic entrepreneurs or political activists who conduct cross-border activities on a regular basis, that lies at the core of the phenomenon that this field seeks to highlight and investigate. 3 These are, to use Glick Schiller and Fouron's (1999) term, the true "transmigrants."
In this article, we focus on the phenomenon of political transnationalism as it manifests itself among immigrant groups in the United States. We have assembled data that allow us to answer or explore three fundamental questions: (1) Is there such a thing as a class of political transmigrantsimmigrants who become involved in their home country polities on a regular basis? (2) If so, who are they and what are the main determinants of their participation in this form of activism? (3) If so, are there patterned differences across immigrant nationalities in the incidence and forms adopted by this phenomenon? 2 Studies of various transnational activities have been conducted among a number of immigrant groups in the past. These include Brazilians (Margolis 1994) ; Central Americans (Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991; Mahler 1995 Mahler , 1998 Mahler , 1999 ; Dominicans (Georges 1990; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Portes and Guarnizo 1991; Levitt 2001b; Graham 1997; Sørensen 1998) ; Ecuadorans (Kyle 2000) ; Mexicans (Massey et al. 1987; Rouse 1992; Massey and Parrado 1994; R. Smith 1994 R. Smith , 1998 Goldring 1998) ; Haitians (Glick Schiller et al. 1995; Fouron 1999, 2001 ); Filipinos (Basch et al. 1994; Wolf 1997) ; Chinese (Zhou 1992; Mitchell 1997; Smart and Smart 1998; J. Lin 1998; Ong 1999) ; and Indians (Lessinger 1992) . With the exception of the studies by Massey and his collaborators and Kyle's work on Ecuadorans, most of this literature is nonquantitative and based on ethnographic evidence. 3 Transnational engagement is not limited solely to public sphere activities, though. Transnational actors also include members of families or households residing in more than one country who maintain steady relations with each other (i.e., providing economic, social, and emotional support and keeping family relations, loyalties, and obligations alive) across borders (see Kyle 2000, pp. 102-12; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001, chap. 4; Gardner and Ralph Grillo 2002) .
POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM: PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE
The recent research literature on immigrant transnationalism has made several important claims that deserve attention as a prelude to our own analysis. Several scholars have argued that migrants' loyalty and commitment to their homelands from afar constitute an alternative political force that not only alters local traditional structures but also opens up new opportunities for their communities of origin. Migrants are depicted as agents of change, who support and promote local development initiatives through hometown associations (Goldring 1996; R. Smith 1994 R. Smith , 1998 Gonzá lez Gutierrez 1995) , as well as active political participants (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; M. Smith 1994; Graham 1997; Itzigsohn et al. 1999) and direct international investors (Portes and Guarnizo 1991; Massey and Parrado 1994; Baires 1997; Kyle 1999 Kyle , 2000 . For many sending countries, such as Colombia, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic, migrants' monetary remittances have already become a major source of hard currency and the cornerstone of their countries' macroeconomic and social stability.
Several immigrant communities also remain an important part of their country's electorate. Political parties from these countries have opened chapters in immigrant settlements, while political candidates regularly campaign among expatriates to gain their political favor and monetary support (Graham 1997; McDonnell 1997; Itzigsohn et al. 1999) . In countries such as the Dominican Republic, migrants' financial contributions are estimated to be as much as 15% of major Dominican parties' annual fundraising revenues (Graham 1997, p. 101) . Even people who have lived overseas for several decades are reported to maintain their involvement with their homelands either in support of or in opposition to the incumbent government (see, e.g., Kearney 1991 Kearney , 1995 Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; M. Smith 1994; Kyle 2000) .
At the same time, an increasing number of states, including those of the countries included in our study, have introduced constitutional reforms to provide dual citizenship rights and formal political representation to their expatriates (Lessinger 1992; Mahler 1998; Guarnizo and Smith 1998) . Such a panoply of initiatives has transformed the way in which migrants incorporate themselves into the societies where they reside. Incentives provided by sending countries are designed to maintain the loyalty of their expatriates and keep their remittances, investments, and political contributions flowing. At the same time, such incentives provide a new and stronger "voice" for organized immigrants in the politics of their country and home communities (Roberts, Frank, and Lozano-Asencio 1999) .
The question is how and to what extent immigrants choose to avail themselves of these new opportunities for political action. This literature leaves little doubt about the existence of the phenomenon of political transnationalism and its transformative potential, but it says little about the actual numbers involved or their characteristics and motivations. The relative presence and causes of transnationalism represent the logical questions in need of answer at this time. To accomplish this task properly, we seek guidance from existing sociological theories bearing on the processes of immigrant settlement and incorporation.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES
Potential determinants of immigrant transnationalism can be drawn from three different theoretical literatures: (a) classical theories of the role of individual factors in immigrant assimilation; (b) contemporary theories of contextual embeddedness as determinant of immigrants' incorporation to host societies; and (c) social network theory. Given the novelty of the phenomenon, the resulting hypotheses are tentative; we use them as an initial guide for exploring its onset and development.
Individual Characteristics Affecting Assimilation
Orthodox theoretical approaches to immigration, especially push-pull and assimilation theories, were based, for the most part, on the early-20th-century European immigration experience to the United States and elsewhere (Warner and Srole 1945; Gordon 1964) . These theories continue to underlie the "canonical" view of how the process of assimilation plays itself out (Alba and Nee 1997) . One of its guiding assumptions is of a world divided into well-defined sovereign national political units. Accordingly, migrants move from country A to country B and either settle for good (i.e., become "immigrants") or move back home after reaching their economic objectives (i.e., become "sojourners"). Immigrants who settle abroad are eventually expected to assimilate into the dominant society's sociocultural and economic systems while simultaneously shedding their "old" cultural practices and political loyalties (Warner and Srole 1945; Gordon 1964; Alba 1985) . The main hypothesis derived from this perspective is that the longer immigrants live and are socialized into the ways of the host society, the greater the likelihood of their becoming thoroughly absorbed in it. As far as transnationalism is concerned, the logical corollary here is that longer periods of U.S. residence should lead to progressive disengagement from old country loyalties and attachments.
The same theoretical perspective generally expects immigrants to have a single identity, national allegiance, and representation in one national polity (Pickus 1998; Schuck 1998) . Accordingly, cultural identity and political membership are defined as well-bounded characteristics, such that acquiring new ones implies abandoning those held previously (Kessler 1998; Motomura 1998) . The hypothesis derived from this reasoning is that immigrants who have naturalized as citizens would be much less likely to continue involving themselves in the politics of their home nation. Becoming a U.S. citizen should act as a "natural barrier" to the continuation of political transnationalism. Another important individual characteristic is education. However, the predictive role of this variable is ambiguous. For assimilation theory, education should lead to a decline in home country ties, insofar as it facilitates swifter integration and mobility in the host society (Bernard 1936; Gordon 1964; Borjas 1987 Borjas , 1990 . Educated immigrants, therefore, would be significantly more inclined to shift allegiances and transfer their energies and interests toward their new country (Pickus 1998) . This prediction is questioned by an extensive literature that shows that education increases political participation worldwide (Lipset 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Olsen 1980; Tarrow 1998) . Thus individuals who were already interested or active in the politics of their home countries continue these interests even after emigrating. In that case, higher education would lead to an increase in transnationalism. The way that these contradictory expectations play out in reality has not been elucidated.
The Role of Gender
A recent literature on the relationship between gender and immigration finds that men and women have quite disparate views toward their receiving and sending countries (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991, 1996; Kibria 1993; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Guarnizo 1997; Mahler 1999; Mahler and Pessar 2001) . Commonly, males experience occupational downward mobility upon immigration. Women's experience tends to go the opposite way, as many of them become paid workers for the first time in the United States. Women's labor market incorporation brings about significant changes in how they perceive themselves and are perceived by men within and outside the household (Ferná ndez-Kelly and Garcia 1990).
More specifically, Jones-Correa (1998) has introduced a gendered view of migrants' political orientation and engagement. Reinforcing earlier arguments, he asserts that Latin American immigrant men in the United States tend to have a stronger political perspective and are more likely than women to become involved in transnational political activities: "With the loss of status in the receiving country, men tend to form, participate in and lead ethnic organizations whose interests and focus is in the country of origin. In contrast, women [are] more likely to shift their orientation toward the United States" (Jones-Correa 1998, pp. 34-35) .
In many sending countries, including those of Latin America, men have traditionally dominated politics. In this context, Jones-Correa's prediction should be understood as asserting that this traditional male hegemony continues after immigration but that it remains fixed in the countries and communities of origin to compensate partially for the status loss experienced by men in receiving ones. The data for our analysis allow us to examine both the role of gender and that of downward mobility as possible determinants of political transnationalism.
Contexts of Migration
Immigrant adaptation is affected not only by individual characteristics but also by their contexts of exit and reception (Portes and Rumbaut 1996) . An extensive literature dating back at least to the classic Midtown Manhattan Project (Srole, Lanner, and Mitchell 1962) supports the proposition that the greater the sociocultural differences between newcomers and the host society, the more difficult their process of incorporation. Hence, it can be expected that people emigrating from remote rural places to metropolitan areas in the United States will be less likely to adapt easily and, by the same token, will remain more closely attached to their past. Referring to the experiences of European peasants migrating to U.S. metropolitan areas, Srole et al. (1962, p. 234) concluded that "to compress the profound historical changes of a revolutionizing century into a few adult years can exact a high price."
Expectations held by kin and friends about the proper duration of the journey abroad can also affect immigrants' economic and political behavior. These "socially expected durations" (SEDs) were originally theorized by Merton (1984) as a decisive element in social life affecting a wide range of individual and collective activities. For the specific case of U.S.-bound migrants, Roberts (1995) applied Merton's concept to show that the propensity to engage in entrepreneurial ventures varies systematically with the SEDs of migration: those who are subject to strong normative expectations of return are less likely to launch businesses in the United States because they are strongly oriented toward saving for investments at home. Following Roberts' logic, we hypothesize that temporary SEDsthat is, normative expectations of return-will also increase transnationalism insofar as it helps preserve ties with the country and community of origin.
Contexts of reception in the United States also bear significantly on immigrants' economic and political adaptation. Governmental and societal reception of immigrant nationalities can range from a favorable or at least neutral stance to active hostility and discrimination (Portes and Rumbaut 1996) . Differences in this respect among the three immigrant groups selected for study are described in the following section. For all immigrants, a more negative context of reception, marked by downward occupational mobility, should lead to the perpetuation of ties with the home countries. As several authors have noted, transnational activism can function, under these circumstances, as a compensatory mechanism for the immigrants' status loss (Jones-Correa 1998; Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Landolt 2001) .
Social Networks
Sociologists have described migration as a network-building process that builds upon itself, facilitating the departure and settlement of newcomers and sustaining the movement when the original economic incentives have disappeared (Anderson 1974; Tilly 1990; Massey et al. 1987; Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994) . The notion of cumulative causation has been invoked to describe the operation of networks of migration, whereby early departures pave the way for subsequent ones, lowering the costs and risks of the initial journey (Portes and Bach 1985; Massey and Espinoza 1997) .
We expect that the onset and continuation of transnational activities will follow the same logic. In the absence of large economic resources, the implementation of long-distance ventures must depend on the maintenance of a strong web of social contacts. The larger or more difficult the attempted transnational project is, the stronger the social networks required to sustain it. Thus we predict that, regardless of the motivations individuals have for engaging in political transnationalism, the latter will be conditioned by the size and spatial scope of their networks. The larger and more spatially diversified these are, the greater the chances for engaging in political initiatives across national borders.
GROUPS STUDIED
Salvadoran, Dominican, and Colombian immigrants form part of the newest wave of mass immigration in the United States. These groups make up approximately 15% of the Latin American immigrant population (Farley 2001) . Despite common cultural origins, these communities represent very different migratory experiences, shaped by the combined effects of global forces and national realities. We expect these national variations to affect, in predictable ways, the course of immigrant adap-tation. For this reason, a brief introduction to the history of each group is in order.
Immigrants from Colombia (which has a population of 43 million) first started to arrive in significant numbers in New York and Los Angeles in the wake of the Second World War. The first wave of Colombians was formed mostly by upper-middle-class and professional people. After the 1965 immigration reform, the social composition of the inflow included mostly middle-and working-class immigrants in search of economic improvement (Chaney 1976; Cruz and Castañ o 1976; Cardona et al. 1980) . Since the mid-1980s, a deepening political and economic crisis in Colombia and growth of the drug trade have resulted in a significant expansion of migration, primarily from urban areas (Urrea-Giraldo 1982) .
Recent research points to high levels of mutual distrust among Colombian immigrants stemming from insecurity at home and the shadow of the drug trade (Guarnizo and Diaz 1999) : Colombians seldom cluster in tightly knit communities and become dispersed instead in large metropolitan areas. The major destination is New York City, where two-fifths of a U.S. Colombian population estimated at 750,000 resides. Even in New York, these immigrants remain relatively invisible, except in certain sections of Queens, such as Jackson Heights (Guarnizo, Sá nchez, and Roach 1999; U.S. Census Bureau 1993c). Because of this spatial dispersion and their relatively high educational levels, Colombians have not been targets of extensive discrimination in the United States-notwithstanding the stigma of drug trafficking attached to Colombia. These circumstances, in addition to their alienation from traditional electoral politics and the convulsed sociopolitical situation of their country, lead us to predict limited involvement in political transnationalism. We suggest that this holds true despite the political rights, including voting rights from abroad and congressional representation, granted to them by the Colombian state. Relative to other groups, Colombians should tend to avoid continuous political engagement with their home nation.
Emigration from the Dominican Republic was severely constrained during the 30-year Trujillo dictatorship, but it suddenly increased after the dictator's assassination in 1961 (Hendricks 1974; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991) . At the time, a substantial number of opposition leaders were forcefully expatriated by a provisional government seeking to alleviate domestic pressures. The U.S. government expeditiously issued visas to these deportees and, later, "cooperated at the provisional government's request, by refusing to permit the deportees to leave the United States" (Martin 1966, p. 347) . This politically driven out-migration, concentrated in New York City, established the beachhead for subsequent waves of economic immigrants to the same area. By the end of the 1990s, approximately 10% of the Dominican population was residing in the United States (U.S.
Census Bureau 1999, p. 12) . Areas with a high concentration of Dominicans in New York City, such as Washington Heights, and in some smaller northeast cities such as Providence, Rhode Island, have become sites for intense Dominican economic, cultural, and political activity (Itzigsohn et al. 1999) .
Given the political roots of Dominican emigration and the active presence of national parties in this expatriate community, we expect political transnationalism to be relatively more common than among other migrants. The Dominican Republic is at peace and democracy has taken hold, so that active competition for office takes place regularly among the three largest national parties (Lozano 1997) . Voting rights for Dominicans living abroad have been approved, and the consul general in New York has been selected in recent years from among leaders of that community (Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Levitt 2001a Levitt , 2001b . Such gestures contribute to reinforcing the web of transnational political ties between the sending nation and its emigrants.
Salvadorans come from a small (6.4 million) and densely populated Central American country that has been highly dependent on U.S. economic and geopolitical interests. During the early 1960s, Salvadoran immigration to the United States increased and was dominated by professionals, technocrats, and investors. These well-to-do immigrants opened channels for labor migration by importing Salvadoran domestic workers (Repak 1995; Mahler 1995) . The civil war between 1980 and 1992 set off a massive exodus to the United States, mostly from rural areas (Aguayo and Fagen 1988; Montes Mozo and Garcia Vasquez 1988; Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989; Có rdoba 1995; Lungo 1997) . By 1999, about half of the total Salvadoran immigrant population in the United States, estimated at over 800,000, resided in the Los Angeles metropolitan area (U.S. Census Bureau 1999; Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996; Chinchilla, Hamilton, and Loucky 1993) . The Washington, D.C., metropolitan area hosts the second largest concentration of Salvadorans, with an estimated population of close to 250,000 (Landolt, Autler, and Baires 1999, p. 293) .
Although the majority of Salvadorans left their country because of political violence, their claims to asylum were routinely denied by U.S. authorities, who classified them as illegal immigrants (Lopez, Popkin, and Tellez 1996) . Despite their precarious legal and economic status, Salvadoran migrants managed to maintain close ties with their communities and families of origin and to support them economically. Their remittances have consistently surpassed $1 billion per year during the last decade and constitute the country's single most important source of foreign exchange today (Banco Central de El Salvador 1996; Landolt 2000) .
Most Salvadoran immigrants come from small towns and rural areas severely affected by the country's civil war. The strong bonds forged during that war were sustained and expanded after the country returned to peace. A still incipient democracy and frail political parties have failed to create many opportunities for migrant participation in Salvadoran electoral politics. Instead, expatriates and their organizations have concentrated their efforts at the local level, seeking to aid and improve their communities of origin (Landolt 2000; Menjivar 2000) . Salvadoran transnationalism can thus be expected to follow a distinct course, defined by the historical context under which the original migration took place: unlike Colombians, Salvadorans are expected to sustain strong ties with their country of origin; unlike Dominicans they do not channel such ties through national political parties but link directly with the towns and regions of origin.
As previously noted, all three sending nations have implemented policies designed to sustain the loyalty of their expatriates and to encourage a continuing flow of remittances and investments Landolt 2000; Levitt 2001b ). Despite these common policies, we expect the three groups to differ systematically even after controlling for individual variables. These differences reflect their distinct histories of departure and resettlement, as just seen. Table 1 presents a profile of the countries of origin and characteristics of each immigration according to the latest official figures.
DATA AND METHOD
Data for this study come from the Comparative Immigrant Enterprise Project (CIEP), a collaborative effort focused on entrepreneurship and institutional development among the three groups described. 4 The project included both qualitative and quantitative data gathered between fall 1996 and winter 1998. The first phase of the study consisted of in-depth interviews with 353 key informants in six areas of immigrant concentration in the United States (two for each nationality) and two cities, including the capital, of each country of origin. The second phase was a probability survey of immigrant communities in four cities corresponding to the principal areas of concentration of the target nationalities. Dominicans were contacted and interviewed in the Washington Heights area of Manhattan and in Providence, Rhode Island; the Colombian survey took place in New York City, mainly in the borough of Queens; and the Salvadoran survey was conducted simultaneously in central and selected suburban areas of Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. The CIEP survey was completed in 1998, gathering data on a total of 1,202 adult family heads.
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The survey can be considered representative of each immigrant nationality in its principal areas of concentration, especially because nonresponse rates were uniformly low. However, sampling fractions-the ratio of the sample to the eligible population in each area-varied significantly among surveyed communities. To adjust for this problem we developed a set of weights based on the estimated sampling fraction in each area. Sampling fractions were computed by dividing the final sample by 1990 Census figures of the adult population of the target nationality in each area. Weights are the reverse of these sampling fractions (Kish 1967; Frankel 1983) . The adjusted figures allow us to compare national samples and avoid unequal probability bias in the estimation of coefficients based on the full sample. Appendix table A1 presents the sampling sites for each nationality, unweighted samples, and corresponding sampling fractions.
Conventionally, political participation is measured by electorally related indicators. However, immigrants also seek to be represented and participate in decision making through political means other than elections. Thus, under the concept of transnational political participation, we include both electoral and nonelectoral activities aimed at influencing conditions in the home country. Each type of political participation is measured by a count of the number of activities in which respondents are involved on a regular basis. Transnational electoral participation includes membership in a political party in the country of origin, monetary contributions to these parties, and active involvement in political campaigns in the polity of origin. Transnational nonelectoral politics includes membership in a hometown civic association, monetary contributions to civic projects in the community of origin, and regular membership in charity organizations sponsoring projects in the home country.
Nonelectoral activities of this type are political because they influence local and regional governments by determining which public projects receive migrants' financial support. By so doing, they compel authorities to take immigrant wishes and priorities into account. As Levitt (1997a Levitt ( , 1997b and Landolt (2000) have noted, helping finance local development projects or contributing to philanthropic works represent effective mechtionality or other characteristics, it was replaced. This sampling fraction preserved sample representativeness by keeping the number of interviews in each PSU (city block) proportional to the size of its eligible population (Kish 1967) . This design was supplemented by a purposive sample of entrepreneurs identified through informant leads gathered during the first phase of the project. The number and diversity of informants insured multiple entry points to entrepreneurial activities, giving the sample broad coverage of such activities in each community and avoiding the familiar limitations of single snowball chains (Singleton and Straits 1999, pp. 156-63). anisms to uphold high status and political influence in the localities of origin.
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Questionnaire items measuring involvement in each of these six types of political activities provided three response categories: "never," "occasionally/once in a while," and "regularly." In keeping with the previous theoretical discussion concerning reasons for operationally restricting the meaning of transnationalism, our primary focus in the following analysis is on activities in which respondents were involved on a regular basis. This definition identifies the class of migrants who have become most committed to transnational political action. As noted previously, however, the transnational field is also nurtured by the more occasional activities of other immigrants, and we also pay attention to these activities.
Among independent variables, age, sex, marital status, and years of U.S. residence are self-measured by individual questionnaire items. National origin corresponds to the original survey screening question used to determine sampling eligibility. Education is measured as years completed, coded into three ordered achievement categories. U.S. citizenship acquisition is coded "1" if the respondent had naturalized American and "0" otherwise. Corresponding to the remaining hypotheses, urban/rural places of origin are coded into three mutually exclusive size categories (large city, small city, and rural); SEDs of migration is a dummy variable coded "1" if the respondent's family expected the journey abroad to be temporary and "0" otherwise; downward mobility is the ratio of the occupational status of the last regular job in the country of origin to the first in the United States. Higher values of this variable, coded along a five-point status scale, indicate greater downward mobility.
Network size is measured by the absolute number of persons in the respondent's social networks, and network spatial scope by the ratio of out-of-town contacts, including those living abroad, to those in the city of residence. Both measures are drawn from a name-generator module in the CIEP questionnaire, designed to elicit first names and characteristics of individuals on whom respondents could rely for both occupational and personal needs (Burt and Minor 1983; Scott 1991; N. Lin 1998) . The CIEP data set provides the first quantitative estimates of the phenomenon of transnationalism, allowing us to examine effects of both network size and spatial scope on each dependent variable. Appendix table B1 presents 6 A recent study in El Salvador based on the first phase of this project concluded that "life conditions in municipalities that receive grassroots transnational aid confirm the relevance of this collective remittance strategy. Towns with a hometown association have paved roads, electricity, and freshly painted public buildings. The quality of life in transnational towns is simply better" (Portes and Landolt 2000, p. 543) . measurement characteristics and frequency distributions of all the variables used in the analysis.
RESULTS
General Characteristics of the Sample Table 2 presents a general profile of the sample. It shows that respondents are, on average, middle-aged and married; they arrived in the United States at a prime productive age, mainly from urban metropolitan areas, and have resided here for some 15 years. Close to one-third had become U.S. citizens by the time of the survey, but one-fourth still have children living in the country of origin and almost one-fifth travels there on a regular basis. Average group characteristics of the CIEP sample correspond in order of magnitude to figures from the 1990 census (see table 1). Both indicate that Colombians are on average older, have higher levels of educational attainment and personal incomes, and the highest rate of naturalization (44%) of the three groups. Dominicans are mostly at the opposite end regarding educational attainment and income, while Salvadorans exhibit the lowest naturalization rate. Table 3 presents frequency distributions of transnational political activism based on the strict definition adopted previously and on a more inclusive approach that includes both regular and occasional participation in these activities. The latter results show that the transnational field engages, in one form or another, up to a third of each immigrant group. Core transnational activists, on the other hand, are much less numerous, representing less than one-sixth of the sample. This figure contrasts markedly with past ethnographic descriptions of transnationalism as a form of political action adopted by entire immigrant communities. Around these averages, however, there are statistically significant variations by nationality: Dominican immigrants are most likely to engage in electoral party politics and Salvadorans most likely to focus on hometown civic committees and community projects; close to one-fifth of the Salvadoran sample takes part in these kinds of activities on a regular basis. Differences by nationality correspond to our predictions based on the known contexts of exit and reception of each group. To separate these group effects from those of individual-level factors, we incorporate all predictors in models of political transnationalism, defined strictly and loosely. 7 Figures in tables 1 and 2 do not coincide because of the differences in dates of data collection and target universes. Census figures are for the entire population of each nationality in 1990; the CIEP survey data are limited to adult heads of the three nationalities in these respective areas of concentration. 
Predictive Models
Our dependent variable, the number of transnational political activities in which immigrants become involved, is a count variable with a range of 0-6. Following the preceding definition, regular participation or involvement is coded "1" and occasional or no participation "0." The use of linear regression for this dependent variable can result in inconsistent, inefficient, or biased estimates. The distribution of such variables is commonly modeled as a Poisson process. Deviations of the univariate distribution from Poisson are usually accounted for by heterogeneity in the average rate and are modeled accordingly (Long 1997, p. 221) .
Poisson regression models rarely fit the data, however, because of the assumption of equidispersion in the conditional distribution, m p d p i . In practice, the variance frequently exceeds the mean. Prelimexp (x b) i inary analysis shows that this condition, known as overdispersion, is present in our data. Negative binomial regression models (NBRM) obviate this constraint by replacing the conditional mean by a random variable m i where and is random error uncorrelated with .
The conditional mean of the negative binomial distribution is the same as the Poisson distribution, but the variance differs (Long 1997, p. 233) . The extent of overdispersion is estimated by the NBREG routine of Stata, which also provides a likelihood ratio test of significance. Predictor variables in our models follow the preceding theoretical discussion and include gender, education, size of community of origin, years in the United States, SEDs of migration, downward mobility, and national origin. As control variables, we add the linear and quadratic forms of age and marital status. The CIEP survey contains several different measures of respondents' social networks. Following the preceding discussion, we include network size (absolute number of respondent's social ties) and scope (the ratio of long-distance to local ties in the city of residence). The assumption is that larger and more geographically dispersed networks will be more conducive to transnational activism.
NBR coefficients can be transformed into percentages indicating the net increase/decrease in the relative probabilities of the dependent variable associated with a unit increase in each predictor. For clarity of presentation, we present these figures for all NBR coefficients that are statistically significant. The percentage change associated with significant coefficients has the advantage of not depending on the value of other predictors, unlike NBR coefficients that predict the actual count of transnational activities contingent on other variables. We use robust variance estimators to correct for the two-stage cluster sample design in different cities. The corrected variances do not affect the actual coefficients, but they adjust for underestimation of errors that can lead to inflated Z-scores. Robust standard errors provide a much more demanding criteria for statistical significance than ordinary ones so that regression coefficients that meet this criterion can be confidently tagged as reliable. Table 4 presents our results in two sets of columns. The first regresses political transnationalism, defined according to the strict criterion given above. These results provide the main source for our conclusions. The second column redefines the dependent variable based on a broader def-inition of transnationalism that codes as "1" both regular and occasional involvement in each of the activities counted as part of the index. These results allow us to examine to what extent determinants of political transnationalism vary according to the empirical definition of the concept.
The first column of the table highlights the nonlinear effect of age, as indicated by a significant negative quadratic coefficient. This means that engagement in transnational politics increases substantially during adulthood but declines in old age. The gender and marital status coefficients show that transnational activists are overwhelmingly married males. The column presenting the percentage change associated with each significant coefficient indicates that the gender effect is very strong, with males being over twice more likely to be involved in these activities. The tendency increases by an additional 13% for those married.
Both high school and college graduations lead to significant increases in the probability of political transnationalism. The high school effect is the strongest, exceeding 10 times its standard error and increasing regular engagement in these activities by 173% relative to nongraduates. These results support predictions based on conventional theories of political participation rather than on those derived from assimilation theory. Other hypotheses derived from the same perspective are also unsupported by the data: U.S. citizenship acquisition has no effect on the dependent variables, and length of U.S. residence actually increases the probability of political transnationalism.
These findings suggest that it is not the least educated, more marginal, or more recent arrivals who are most prone to retain ties with their home country politics. While running contrary to conventional expectations concerning immigrant assimilation, a moment's reflection suffices to make sense of these results. Educated immigrants are more capable of following events in their home countries and seeking a role in them; the passage of time and acquisition of U.S. citizenship do not necessarily reduce this interest since their assimilative potential is balanced by the greater security and stability that they produce. A U.S. passport enables former migrants to travel back and forth without restrictions; greater time in the United States is usually associated with economic stability and more resources to invest in favored political causes.
The hypothesis concerning significant effects of urban versus rural origins is not supported by the data, nor is that predicting greater transnational activism among the downwardly mobile. We interpret these results as supportive of the previous findings, indicating that transnationalism is not a compensatory mechanism for migrants most affected by the traumas of adaptation to urban life or those suffering from status loss. We further interacted downward mobility with gender to test Jones-Correa's (1998) notion that the proclivity of males to engage in Note.-Data for predictors is a weighted sample. For description of the variables, see app. table B1. The reference category for "place of origin" is "rural"; for "human capital," it is "less than high school education"; for "nationality," it is "Dominican." The significance levels and z-scores are computed with robust estimates of SEs.
a Ratio of last home country occupation to first occupation in the United States. b Ratio of nonlocal to local ties in respondent's city of residence. c Test of equidispersion of conditional variance. Higher values indicate departures from the assumption that and, hence, the inappropriateness of m p j p exp (x b) 1 Poisson regression models for these data.
* P ! .05. ** P ! .01. *** P ! .001.
home country politics is a consequence of status loss. The resulting coefficient (not shown) is statistically insignificant and does not alter the pattern of effects presented in table 4. Once again, it appears that transnationalism is not a refuge for the marginal and downtrodden, but a practice associated with greater stability and greater resources brought from the home country. The hypothesis of socially expected duration is, however, strongly supported. Immigrants whose families expect them to return at some point (temporary SEDs) are significantly more likely to retain political ties with their countries than those never expected to return. The increase in the count of regular transnational activities brought about by the temporary SEDs is 55%. Along the same lines, respondents with larger social networks are much more likely to participate. We find that it is the size of the networks rather than their physical location that makes the difference. Each additional tie, regardless of whether it is local or not, increases the count of transnational activities by 10%.
8 Taken together, these findings indicate that political transnationalism is associated with well-connected migrants who remain normatively attached to their home communities by kin and friendship ties.
With Dominicans as the reference category, results show that Colombian immigrants are the least likely to take part in home country politics, while Salvadorans and Dominicans are about equally likely to do so. The Colombian negative coefficient is very strong, exceeding 19 times its standard error. This finding is important for two reasons: first, it confirms the influence of national origin and the associated contexts of exit and reception for each immigrant group; second, it fits well the history of each nationality and its particular resettlement experiences. Colombians want little to do with their country's politics, having escaped a situation of profound instability, official corruption, and widespread violence. The return to social peace in El Salvador and the relative political stability in the Dominican Republic facilitate regular cross-border ties by their expatriates, though, as we will see, their form and determinants also vary.
A look at the second sets of columns of table 4 shows that "broad" political transnationalism follows a parallel course, but that effects are generally weaker. For example, the gender effect is more than halved, 8 We recognize that social networks can also be strengthened by transnational activities and, hence, that the relationship between both variables may involve a causal loop. However, commonsense scholarship and our own in-depth interviews during the first phase of CIEP indicate that socially isolated immigrants are unlikely to take the first steps toward transnational political participation. It is well-connected immigrants, both locally and abroad, who are most motivated and able to take part in these activities. Their networks can be increased as a result, but the primary causal linkage runs in the direction of social contacts leading to transnational involvement.
while that of high school graduation drops 82 percentage points. Importantly, neither marital status nor length of U.S. residence have significant effects in this alternative definition of the dependent variable. This suggests that the greater stability associated with marriage and permanent settlement in the United States increases the probability of regular, core transnational engagement but has no bearing on occasional participation. Broad political transnationalism emerges from this analysis as a diluted version of the strict version. It is affected by the same set of determinants, only less so. A probable reason is that occasional transnationalism is conjunctural and, hence, less dependent on the social and educational resources and political traditions that sustain regular involvement. Table 5 summarizes our results to this point, indicating how each hypothesis has fared in the analysis as predictor of both versions of the dependent variable and the resulting evaluation of the underlying theories. Classic assimilation predictions are consistently rejected while those stemming from gender differences and contexts of exit and reception are supported. Political transnationalism is, in this analysis, strongly associated with national origin and a product of greater human capital, greater stability and experience in the receiving society, plus strong social connections and enduring moral ties with sending communities.
Interaction Effects
The resilient effects of national origin on both dependent variables suggests that different contexts of exit and reception may not only affect political transnationalism additively, but also interact with other predictors. We examine this possibility by running separate regressions for each immigrant nationality of political transnationalism on the same set of predictors considered previously. Because determinants of broad transnationalism continue to have parallel, albeit weaker effects than those bearing on a strict definition of the concept, we omit them from this analysis. Table 6 presents these results, which reveal several major differences among the three groups. The last column of the table presents formal tests of significance of these differences. 9 The overall trend is for Colombian transnationalism to be not only exceptional but also more weakly determined. This is shown by the corresponding R 2 and the few predictors that achieve statistical significance in this case. 9 This is a Wald test of significance of the interaction effects between nationality and each individual predictor. It is computed by comparing the NBR coefficients associated with each predictor in a pooled regression where equals the predictor variable X N X j i j and equals each specific nationality (see Judge et al. 1985, pp. 20-28; McDowell N i 2001; StataCorp 1999) . For Colombians, only place of origin and a college education affect the dependent variable. The original hypothesis concerning the positive effect of rural origins on the perpetuation of home country ties is supported in this instance. In addition, college graduation also increases participation in these activities. Hence, it appears that whatever transnational political activism exists among Colombian immigrants, it follows a bimodal pattern involving highly educated individuals and those coming from traditional rural areas. As seen before, most Colombians show little inclination to engage in home country politics of any kind. Since migrants from that country come increasingly from urban areas and experience a dominant political culture of disengagement (Guarnizo and Diaz 1999) , our results suggest that this pattern of disinterest in transnational activities may become even stronger in the future.
Dominicans and Salvadorans are much more vigorously involved in the politics of their home countries. The corresponding regressions intro-duce controls for city of residence, since both national samples were drawn from more than one city. No statistically significant differences between areas of residence were found in either case. In both cases, however, network size increases transnationalism significantly: each additional tie raises the net count of Dominican transnational activities by 16% and the count for Salvadorans by 9%. The effect of education is also similar for both groups. Since so few Salvadoran or Dominican immigrants are college educated, the key human capital effect is that of high school graduation and it is quite strong in both cases. Differences between Salvadorans and Dominicans, on the one hand, and Colombians, on the other, in the effects of social networks are significant, as shown in table 6. Differences in the interaction effects between education and nationality approach, but fail to achieve, statistical significance.
The same pattern is evident with gender effects. Unlike Colombians, among whom gender is an insignificant predictor, Dominican and Salvadoran males are much more likely to participate in transnational politics. The effect is especially strong among Dominicans, where it exceeds six times its standard error. Temporary SEDs of migration have positive effects among Dominicans and Salvadorans, but only the latter effect is significant, increasing the count of transnational activities by 53%. By contrast, the effect of downward occupational mobility proves to be significant among Dominican immigrants only. In this instance, the direction of the effect runs contrary to the original hypothesis: instead of increasing the tendency to engage in transnational activity, downward mobility actually decreases it. The interaction between nationality and this variable is significant, as shown in the last column.
Where Dominican and Salvadoran immigrants differ most is in the orientation of their respective political activities. This was observed in table 3 and is further illustrated by the net effect of nationality on each sub-type of transnationalism, controlling for other variables. These are presented in the bottom rows of table 6. With Dominicans as the reference category, the Salvadoran effect on party politics is significant and negative and that on civic community activism is significant and positive. As expected, Colombian effects are uniformly negative. These results support the conclusion that Dominican immigrants are more likely to concentrate on party politics, while Salvadorans bypass it to focus on the affairs of their local hometowns and regions.
Thus, the meaning and scope of political transnationalism is not uniform. Although there are common forces bearing on all immigrants, the particular circumstances of each community also affect the extent and character of these activities. For some immigrants, transnational politics is a means to maintain an active presence in their country's centers of power; for others, it is a means to avoid such centers in order to provide Note.-Description of variables can be found in app. table B1. Significance levels and z-scores computed with robust estimates of SE.For "place of origin," "rural" is the reference category; for "city of residence," New York is the omitted category for Dominicans and Los Angeles is the omitted category for Salvadorans; for "human capital, "less than high school" is the reference catagory; in "assimilation," "downward mobility" is the ratio of the last home country occupation to the first occupation in the United States; in "social networks," "network scope" is the ration of nonlocal-to-local ties in the respondents city of residence. In "national origin effect on transnationalism," we control for all other predictors included in table 4 above; no results are reported for Dominicans, as they are the reference category in this predictor. NS p nonsignificant interaction effect.
a This column reports the significance of interaction effect between each predictor and national origins. * P ! .05. ** P ! .01. *** P ! .001. direct assistance to their native regions; and for still others, it is a practice to be avoided in order to leave a violent and unsettling past behind.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
An emerging transnational perspective has brought new vistas on international migration. It has questioned conventional analyses that focus exclusively on assimilation to the host society, neglecting migrants' ties and ongoing relations with their countries of origin. Yet serious shortcomings and criticisms have been leveled at this perspective. Most early studies of political transnationalism were based on ethnographic evidence and often lacked clear operational definitions. A dearth of knowledge about the size, scope, and determinants of such practices has been a consistent weakness of this field. Comparing Colombian, Dominican, and Salvadoran immigrants in several areas of settlement, this study seeks to address these shortcomings. It provides empirical evidence of the scale and determinants of transnational activism among these populations. Our first significant conclusion is that the transnational political field is not as extensive or evenly distributed among contemporary immigrants as proposed by previous accounts. In fact, the number of immigrants who are regularly involved in cross-border activism is relatively small. However, this proportion reaches up to one-third of the sample if we shift to a more inclusive definition of transnationalism. The fluctuation between a small core and a larger soft rim of transnational activists suggests its sensitivity to changing contextual conditions. Thus, while core transnationals stay involved in their home country politics via electoral or nonelectoral means, others become active only at special junctures such as highly contested elections or natural disasters.
A second set of findings is related to determinants of these practices in relation to predictions stemming from different theoretical schools. Our analysis shows that core transnational engagement is significantly different by gender and associated with migrants' age, human capital, and social capital. Results run counter to classical views of immigrant assimilation, still common in public understandings of the process. Contrary to these views, results indicate that transnational political activities are not the refuge of marginalized or poorly educated immigrants. That conclusion holds, regardless of whether transnationalism is defined strictly or broadly. Along the same lines, length of residence in the United States does not reduce interest or involvement in home country politics but actually increases it.
The uneven distribution of these practices by age and gender coincides with conventional power relations based on patriarchal structures that have historically dominated Latin American politics. The view that greater male participation is a result of downward mobility experiences in the United States is not supported since the corresponding main and interaction effects are insignificant. Support for the hypothesis of a strong gender effect must also be qualified by significant differences among national groups. The male proclivity to participate is relatively strong among Dominicans (the group that gave rise to the hypothesis in the first place), but it is considerably weaker among other nationalities.
In conclusion, our evidence demonstrates that a stable and significant transnational field of political action connecting immigrants with their countries of origin does exist. Within this field, we find a repertoire of cross-border electoral and nonelectoral activities that warrant attention. The analysis shows that migrants' transnational political engagement is far from being socially unbounded and "deterritorialized," as some analysts have argued in the past. Transnational actions are socially bounded across national borders and occur in quite specific territorial jurisdictions. The transnational field is significant not only for home countries but also for the United States, since it affects the way immigrants incorporate themselves and alters conventional expectations about their assimilation.
The presence and dynamics of this phenomenon certainly contradicts a normative view of the assimilation process that places a premium on the rapid shedding of old loyalties and identities. This does not mean, however, that acculturation to the host society is not occurring or that transnational activism necessarily precludes successful integration (Brubaker 2001) . The old-line exclusivist views of how assimilation is supposed to occur are contradicted by the fact that the immigrants most involved in transnational activities are better educated, longer residents of the host society, and more likely to become involved in local politics there (R. Smith 1998; Landolt 2001) . Similarly, transnational activism often seeks to reproduce in home country national and local politics the discourses and institutional practices of probity and respect for civil rights learned in the United States (Levitt 2001b; . By and large, transnational activism is a constructive phenomenon through which people respond to long-distance social obligations and belonging and seek to transform political practices in their sending countries. By the same token, it endows immigrants with a renewed sense of efficacy and self-worth that facilitates their integration into the political institutions of their new country.
APPENDIX A Reference category * Respondents were asked to name up to three alters in multiple domains ranging from closest friends to potential money lenders. Alters' sociodemographic information, including current place of residence, was also collected.
